

# A New Security Architecture for the Arctic

Toril Ringholm, May 2012

<b>1. Project/publication</b>	Conley, H., T. Toland, J. Kraut, A. Østhagen (2012): A New Security Architecture for the Arctic. An American Perspective, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
<b>2. Initiator</b>	The project is carried out within the research project Geopolitics of the High North, supported by the Research Council of Norway.
<b>3. Objective</b>	The aim is to explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic, and to open up the U.S. discussion by focusing on both institutional and policy barriers that are breaking down, and the increasing number of security actors that will play a role in this changing region.
<b>4. Geographical delimitation</b>	The report does not mention a specific spatial delimitation, but refers to "The Arctic" in general.
<b>5. Time horizon</b>	The report does not have a specific time horizon, and no such can be extracted from the text.
<b>6. Thematic focus</b>	The processes of change that are in focus are the new security strategies that emanates from the increasing importance of the Arctic due to the new transport possibilities and access to resources that climate change provides.
<b>7. Images of the future</b>	Explicit images of the future are not drawn. The report is an analysis of the changes in the institutional environment for U.S. security policy in the Arctic.
<b>8. Key driving forces</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Economy: Oil and gas, mineral resources, fisheries, destination and transshipping, and tourism.</li> <li>2) Border protection and protection of sovereignty: The moves made by Russia and Norway are particularly mentioned. So is the dispute between U.S. and Canada over territory in the Beaufort Sea and the status of the Northwest Passage</li> <li>3) New operation environment fraught with danger: Extreme climatic conditions, lack of coherent ice surveillance, lack of satellite communications.</li> </ol>
<b>9. Uncertainties/wildcards</b>	Wild cards are not explicitly mentioned, but three institutions are discussed as possible tools for governing the Arctic: UNCLOS, IMO and The Arctic Council. The conclusion is that they are unfit to address issues of security. The report also underscores the role of non-arctic states; China, Japan and South Korea, which are large shipping nations positioning themselves for the new transportation routes that will be available.
<b>10. Accomplishment and collaboration</b>	The study is expert based, carried out by researchers.
<b>11. Method</b>	The study is largely qualitative. It does, however, also draw on statistical data.
<b>12. Sources of information</b>	The data is gathered from research publications, public documents and public statistics.
<b>13. Strengths</b>	The report is interesting in the way it systematically analyses the possibilities for a security structure within the existing institutional framework. The conclusion is that this framework is not fit for the task. A new solution is suggested, namely The Arctic Coast Guard Forum, based on the two existing coast guard forums NPCGF and NACGF. In other words, the report emphasizes collaboration rather than competition between states in the Arctic.

<b>14. Weaknesses</b>	The report is fairly brief when it comes to the discussion of the realism of setting up an Arctic Coast Guard Forum; i.e. the historic and institutional conditions and the political obstacles to be overcome if establishing the forum.
<b>15. Attention and significance</b>	The report has been referred to on several blogs and home pages on U.S. security issues, coast guard issues and geopolitics. We have not been able to trace a specific political impact.
<b>16. Relevance for the Fram Centre</b>	This work and its authors will be useful for the Fram Centre to be in contact with.