Categories
Oil and gas Security law

Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?

By: Alexander Lott (Marie Curie research fellow at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea).

PDF: https://site.uit.no/nclos/wp-content/uploads/sites/179/2023/11/Alexander-Lott-NCLOS-Blog_Nord-Stream-Jus-in-Bello-Case-Study_-Final.pdf

Matter commented on: The Nord Stream Explosions in the Baltic Sea

1. Introduction

Preliminary Western intelligence reports have emerged about a purportedly pro-Ukrainian group of six divers conducting the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines in September last year. The Ukrainian Government denies any involvement in such an alleged operation. Nonetheless, recently, the Washington Post and Der Spiegel published a joint report which reached the unequivocal conclusion that:

“A senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services played a central role in the bombing of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines last year, according to officials in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, as well as other people knowledgeable about the details of the covert operation. /…/ Chervinsky did not act alone, and he did not plan the operation, according to the people familiar with his role, which has not been previously reported. The officer took orders from more senior Ukrainian officials, who ultimately reported to Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s highest-ranking military officer, said people familiar with how the operation was carried out.”

In this context, this blog post begins by briefly discussing the standards for the potential attribution of the alleged activities of the afore-referred group of divers to Ukraine. This post demonstrates that the legality of the Nord Stream explosions can be assessed from the perspective of the law of armed conflict.  This post debates the question of whether an alleged Ukrainian attack against the Nord Stream pipelines violated the law of armed conflict in the wider framework of the ongoing international armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It examines the legal qualification of the Nord Stream pipelines as a legitimate military objective and the environmental considerations pertaining to the sabotage against these pipelines.

Categories
Blog Oil and gas Security law

The Nord Stream Pipelines through the Lens of Law and Geopolitics

By: Timo Koivurova (Research Professor at Arctic Centre, University of Lapland); Theresa Winkel (Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Lapland)

PDF: https://site.uit.no/nclos/wp-content/uploads/sites/179/2023/06/NCLOS-Blog_Koivurova_Winkel_Final.pdf

Matter commented on: Regulation of Nord Stream Pipelines

  1. Introduction

In the realm of European energy security, few topics have sparked as much debate and controversy as the Nord Stream pipelines. The two projects, consisting of Nord Stream 1 and the more recent Nord Stream 2, are known as one of Europe’s most significant energy infrastructure projects. Different from other pipelines, the intention behind the parallel pipelines was to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany, only transiting maritime zones (but no land territory of other states) on its Baltic Sea route. However, it is not only the size of the overall project that will be remembered for years to come, but also the political tensions, legal challenges, heated discussions on the potential implications for regional energy security and geopolitical dynamics, including the 2022 blasts that caused severe damage to both pipelines.

Categories
Fisheries Oil and gas

EEZs in the Adriatic: challenges and opportunities in a semi-enclosed sea

By: Thomas Bickl

PDF VersionNCLOS Blog Bickl III_EEZs Adriatic

Matter commented on: EEZ declarations of Croatia and Italy

I. Introduction

This blogpost is going to discuss the implications of the EEZs of Croatia and Italy in the Adriatic with regard to the interests of and open issues with third States, hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, maritime transport, fishing, and opportunities for offshore renewable energies.

The Adriatic Sea, a sub-sea of the Mediterranean, as a semi-enclosed sea previously accounted for three riparian States: Albania, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s has led to the establishment of four new littoral States: Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Generally, the Adriatic’s eco-system is particularly vulnerable as its waters are shallow and the exchange or renewal of waters with the Ionian Sea through the relatively narrow Strait of Otranto is limited (Vidas 2013: 353; Blake and Topalović 1996: 4; see also Gačić et al 2001).

Fig. 1     Riparian States and main ports in the Adriatic (source: author; base map: d-maps.com)

Categories
Delimitation Oil and gas

State responsibility for unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas: The case of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and its implications

By: Natalia Ermolina and Constantinos Yiallourides

PDF version: https://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2017/11/JCLOS-Blog-231117_Ghana-blog_final.pdf

Case commented on: ITLOS Special Chamber, Judgment in Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, 23 September 2017.

Background to the dispute between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

For a long time, Ghana believed that there was a de facto maritime boundary line between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and since the 1950s had conducted hydrocarbon activities based on its understanding of this ‘customary boundary’. Côte d’Ivoire, for its part, was not particularly active in protesting Ghana’s hydrocarbon activities. Only in 2009 did Côte d’Ivoire make a proposal as to its view of the maritime boundary thus forming a triangular area of overlapping maritime claims. The area claimed by Côte d’Ivoire covered significant oil and gas fields discovered by Tullow Oil plc operating under a license of Ghana. Ghana alleged that this was the main reason why Côte d’Ivoire raised its claims.

The ITLOS Special Chamber (SC) rejected Ghana’s submission that there was a tacit agreement between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire for the delimitation of their territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf within and beyond 200 n.m. (chapter VII, especially paras. 211-228). At the same time, the SC also rejected Côte d’Ivoire’s proposed boundary. The SC drew a single maritime boundary for the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf within and beyond 200 n.m. (chapter IX). The final boundary drawn by the SC almost coincides with the line argued by Ghana and does not affect Ghana’s petroleum fields found in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, it is not surprising that in many news accounts the SC’s decision is referred to as a victory of Ghana over Côte d’Ivoire.

Categories
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Oil and gas

ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with Respect to Oil and Gas Activities in Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with Respect to Oil and Gas Activities in Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

Decision commented on: International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Special Chamber, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, Order with respect to the prescription of provisional measures, April 25, 2015, ITLOS Case No. 23

By way of a Special Agreement concluded on 3 December 2014, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire submitted a dispute concerning their maritime boundary to a Special Chamber (SC) of ITLOS. The SC was fully constituted on 12 January 2015 and on 27 February 2015 Côte d’Ivoire made a request for the prescription of provisional measures under Article 290(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) requiring Ghana to:

  1. take all steps to suspend all ongoing oil exploration and exploitation operations in the disputed area;
  2. refrain from granting any new permit for oil exploration and exploitation in the disputed area;
  3. take all steps necessary to prevent information resulting from past, ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana, or with its authorization, in the disputed area from being used in any way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire;
  4. and, generally, take all necessary steps to preserve the continental shelf, its superjacent waters and its subsoil; and
  5. desist and refrain from any unilateral action entailing a risk of prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire and any unilateral action that might lead to aggravating the dispute.