Category: Security law

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Oil and gas Security law

Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?

By: Alexander Lott (Marie Curie research fellow at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea).

PDF: https://site.uit.no/nclos/wp-content/uploads/sites/179/2023/11/Alexander-Lott-NCLOS-Blog_Nord-Stream-Jus-in-Bello-Case-Study_-Final.pdf

Matter commented on: The Nord Stream Explosions in the Baltic Sea

1. Introduction

Preliminary Western intelligence reports have emerged about a purportedly pro-Ukrainian group of six divers conducting the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines in September last year. The Ukrainian Government denies any involvement in such an alleged operation. Nonetheless, recently, the Washington Post and Der Spiegel published a joint report which reached the unequivocal conclusion that:

“A senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services played a central role in the bombing of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines last year, according to officials in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, as well as other people knowledgeable about the details of the covert operation. /…/ Chervinsky did not act alone, and he did not plan the operation, according to the people familiar with his role, which has not been previously reported. The officer took orders from more senior Ukrainian officials, who ultimately reported to Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s highest-ranking military officer, said people familiar with how the operation was carried out.”

In this context, this blog post begins by briefly discussing the standards for the potential attribution of the alleged activities of the afore-referred group of divers to Ukraine. This post demonstrates that the legality of the Nord Stream explosions can be assessed from the perspective of the law of armed conflict.  This post debates the question of whether an alleged Ukrainian attack against the Nord Stream pipelines violated the law of armed conflict in the wider framework of the ongoing international armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It examines the legal qualification of the Nord Stream pipelines as a legitimate military objective and the environmental considerations pertaining to the sabotage against these pipelines.

Continue reading “Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?”
Categories
Blog Oil and gas Security law

The Nord Stream Pipelines through the Lens of Law and Geopolitics

By: Timo Koivurova (Research Professor at Arctic Centre, University of Lapland); Theresa Winkel (Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Lapland)

PDF: https://site.uit.no/nclos/wp-content/uploads/sites/179/2023/06/NCLOS-Blog_Koivurova_Winkel_Final.pdf

Matter commented on: Regulation of Nord Stream Pipelines

  1. Introduction

In the realm of European energy security, few topics have sparked as much debate and controversy as the Nord Stream pipelines. The two projects, consisting of Nord Stream 1 and the more recent Nord Stream 2, are known as one of Europe’s most significant energy infrastructure projects. Different from other pipelines, the intention behind the parallel pipelines was to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany, only transiting maritime zones (but no land territory of other states) on its Baltic Sea route. However, it is not only the size of the overall project that will be remembered for years to come, but also the political tensions, legal challenges, heated discussions on the potential implications for regional energy security and geopolitical dynamics, including the 2022 blasts that caused severe damage to both pipelines.

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Northern Sea Route Security law

New Draft Law on the Russian Arctic Straits – Putin’ Money Where the Mouth is?

By: Jan Jakub Solski

PDF: Jan Solski_14092022_NCLOS blog.pdf

Matter commented on: Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On the Amendments to the Federal Law on the Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation, 31 July 1998, No. 155-FZ (on the procedure for the passage of foreign warships and other sea vessels operated for non-commercial purposes in the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation)” (2022 Draft Law).

1         Introduction

The 2022 Draft Law was introduced for consideration in the Russian Duma in August 2022. It deals with the right of entry of foreign warships to internal waters in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and aims to adjust the regime of innocent passage in the Russian territorial sea. This blog analyses the proposed legislation in the larger context of other documents recently adopted by the Russian Federation (unfortunately only available in Russian):

  • Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 16 November 2021, No. 1959, “On Approving the List of Geographic Coordinates of Points Determining the Position of Baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation off the mainland coast and islands of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean and on declaring invalid on the territory of the Russian Federation the section “Arctic Ocean” of the list of Geographic Coordinates of Points Determining the Position of Baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the USSR off the mainland coast and islands of the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and Black Seas, approved by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ,15 January 1985, No. 56-22 (2021 Decree on Arctic Baselines), and
  • Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2022, No. 512 “On the approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2022 Maritime Doctrine).
Continue reading “New Draft Law on the Russian Arctic Straits – Putin’ Money Where the Mouth is?”
Categories
Security law

Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents: Distinguishing between the Rules of Armed Conflict and Law Enforcement

By: Alexander Lott

PDF Version: Alexander Lott_Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents_NCLOSblog_290422

Matter commented on: Hybrid naval warfare; Distinction between naval warfare and maritime law enforcement

1. Introduction

This short blog post aims to provide guidance for parties to hybrid naval warfare for determining whether the rules of armed conflict or law enforcement are applicable to various situations where force has been used against ships. The guidelines are based on the relevant case law and systemized into three scenarios: first, a commercial ship vs. government ship/warship (State vessel) scenario; second, a State vessel vs. commercial ship scenario; third, a State vs. State scenario. The analysis focuses on the use of force against ships, but the rules apply mutatis mutandis also in relation to aircraft and installations and structures at sea.

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Security law

Maritime Security Threats and the Passage Regime in the Bab el-Mandeb

By: Alexander Lott

PDF version: Alexander Lott_210621_NCLOS Blog 

Matter commented on: Maritime security threats and the passage regime in the Bab el-Mandeb

1 Introduction

The strait of Bab el-Mandeb separates Africa from the Arabian Peninsula and is an important element in the connection of the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal interlinks the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, while the Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. In Arabic, Bāb al-Mandab stands for “the gate of tears” (Encyclopaedia Britannica), which in the present-day context is a fitting name for a sea passage in a region that has borne tragic sufferings: a protracted humanitarian crisis and armed conflicts in Yemen, Somalia, and the Ethiopian province of Tigray, a brutal dictatorship in Eritrea, and genocide in Sudan. At the same time, the Bab el-Mandeb is the world’s third-largest maritime oil chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. The oil flow through the Bab el-Mandeb increased from 5.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2014 to 6.2 million b/d in 2018 which accounts for roughly a tenth of total seaborne-traded oil (EIA, 2019). The Bab el-Mandeb bears particular strategic importance for Europe as most of the European Union’s (EU) maritime commerce with Asia crosses this narrow sea passage.

This blog post first discusses the passage regime in the Bab el-Mandeb. Second, it examines the threats posed by terrorism, piracy, civil war, and a hybrid naval war to international navigation through that strait. In this context, hybrid warfare is understood as a phenomenon “where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design” (NATO, 2014, para 13; see also NATO, 2021, para 3). This blog post shows that these threats to international shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb have emerged as waves. As soon as one threat starts to fade away, another emerges. Third, the blog post seeks to find out the main causes of the instability of international navigation through the geopolitically turbulent waters of the Bab el-Mandeb.

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Categories
Northern Sea Route Security law

Navigational rights of warships through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – all bark and no bite?

By: Jan Jakub Solski

PDF version: https://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2019/05/JCLOS-Blog_31.5.2019_Jan-Solski-1.pdf

Document commented on: Draft Resolution of the Government of Russia on Amendments to the Resolution of the Government of Russia No. 1102, 2 October 1999, “On the rules of navigation and presence of foreign warships and other state-owned ships operated for non-commercial purposes in the territorial sea, internal waters, on naval bases, and bases for stationing warships in seaports of the Russian Federation”.

This document, originally prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense, 1 March 2019, has been subject to consultations since then. While it remains to be seen whether or not the Government of Russia ever adopts this Resolution, some of its central ideas deserve comment. To that end this blog post discusses the following points:

  1. The background to this proposal;
  2. Its central elements;
  3. The question of applicable navigational rights within the straits of the NSR;
  4. The question of the (in)consistency of the proposed measures with international law and Russia’s earlier positions.

Background

In September 2019, the French Navy’s new offshore support and assistance vessel, the Rhône (A603) transited the Northeast Passage, starting in Tromsø, Norway, 1 September and ending in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, on 17 September. There is little explicit information available as to whether the vessel coordinated its plans with Russian authorities beforehand, but Russian sources refer to the voyage as conducted “without warning”. It is clear that the vessel navigated independently, without icebreaker assistance or pilotage, although the Russian news agency Interfax informs that the vessel was “monitored” by the radio intelligence equipment of the Northern and Pacific fleets in their areas of responsibility in the Russian Arctic.

Over the past years, different signals, such as the diplomatic note of 29 May 2015, have been coming from another NATO member State, the United States, indicating the US objections and concerns regarding Russia’s NSR regulatory scheme, and, more recently, its readiness to take concrete action by transiting the Russian Arctic with surface vessels as part of the US Freedom of Navigation Program.

Continue reading “Navigational rights of warships through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – all bark and no bite?”